As China seems to roll out the red carpet for the Chief Adviser of the interim Bangladesh government Dr. Muhammad Yunus, with a special aircraft to bring him to Beijing in late March, the message is unmistakable: Bangladesh matters to China.

But as global geopolitics rapidly shifts, how should Dhaka manage its growing ties with Beijing without jeopardizing its relationships with other key allies?

China and Bangladesh have long shared a relationship, but in the last decade, their partnership has deepened substantially.

Under the autocratic rule of Sheikh Hasina, Bangladesh became an integral player in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), receiving billions of dollars in infrastructure investments.

Beijing’s influence in Bangladesh has gone far beyond roads and railways—Bangladesh’s military depends heavily on Chinese weaponry, and diplomatic exchanges have skyrocketed.

However, history suggests that warming relations with China can come with unintended consequences.

Hasina’s final months in power saw a highly publicized visit to Beijing in July 2024, a move that quickly triggered mass protests, unrest, and ultimately her political downfall.

To some observers, the optics of her fall bore an unsettling resemblance to Sri Lanka’s Gotabaya Rajapaksa, whose government collapsed amid accusations of excessive reliance on China.

Now, with Dr. Yunus—often viewed as a neutral, globally respected figure—receiving special treatment from Beijing, one must ask: Is China conducting a charm offensive, or is it hedging its bets in the face of Bangladesh’s shifting political landscape?

The benefits of partnership with China

There is no doubt that from an economic standpoint, China has proven to be an indispensable partner.

It has poured billions into Bangladesh’s infrastructure projects, from roads and railways to power plants and special economic zones.

Unlike Western donors, China places fewer political conditions on its investments, making it an attractive ally for governments eager for rapid development.

Military cooperation has also strengthened, with China continuing to be Bangladesh’s largest defense supplier.

China’s influence also provides Bangladesh with a strategic counterbalance to India, its powerful neighbor.

For decades, Bangladesh’s foreign policy has been shaped by its complex and often uncomfortable dependency on India.

Strengthening ties with China allows Dhaka to diversify its alliances and negotiate from a position of greater leverage.

In addition, China’s support has proved vital in helping Bangladesh navigate the turbulence of global supply chain disruptions.

With China as its largest trading partner, Dhaka benefits from preferential trade agreements and duty-free access to Chinese markets, particularly in the textiles sector.

Given the volatility of global markets, these economic ties offer Bangladesh a much-needed stabilizing factor in its export-driven economy.

Yet, as Bangladesh’s relationship with China grows, so too does the complexity of its position on the global stage.

The country must tread carefully, balancing the economic and strategic benefits of its ties to Beijing with the need to maintain strong relations with the West and India.

As the geopolitical landscape shifts, Bangladesh faces a crucial question: Can it successfully navigate this delicate balancing act, or will its growing dependence on China undermine its broader diplomatic goals?

The next steps taken by Dhaka will be pivotal in determining its place in a rapidly changing world order.

A complex delicate balancing act

History offers cautionary tales for Bangladesh as it deepens its ties with China.

Sri Lanka and Pakistan both became heavily indebted to Beijing, leading to the loss of strategic assets such as ports and infrastructure when repayments became unsustainable.

Bangladesh must be cautious not to fall into a similar debt trap. While its external debt is still manageable compared to its South Asian neighbors, increasing reliance on Chinese financing could limit the country's future policy flexibility.

Geopolitically, a strong tilt towards China could strain Bangladesh’s relations with both India and the US.

India, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has already voiced concerns about China’s growing influence in South Asia, viewing Bangladesh’s rising military and economic dependence on Beijing as a strategic challenge.

Meanwhile, the return of Donald Trump to the White House promises to intensify Washington’s confrontational stance toward China.

Bangladesh risks being caught in the middle of a new Cold War if its foreign policy missteps.

Furthermore, China’s relationship with the Hasina-led regime in Bangladesh reflects a preference for stability—often at the expense of democratic norms.

Beijing’s continued support for strongman governance in Dhaka could fuel resentment among the opposition and civil society, further polarizing the political climate.

Interestingly, Beijing seems to be hedging its bets by courting all factions of Bangladesh’s political spectrum. Since Hasina’s downfall, two major political delegations have visited China.

In late 2024, Beijing even extended invitations to Islamist parties, despite its harsh treatment of Muslims within its own borders.

This was followed by another visit from opposition parties in February 2025. These outreach efforts suggest that China is positioning itself to have leverage regardless of which political faction rises to power in Bangladesh.

While this approach might offer Bangladesh short-term diplomatic flexibility, it could also sow divisions and suspicions within domestic politics, complicating the country’s internal stability.

Walking on China’s diplomatic tightrope

Putting a lot of eggs in the Chinese basket has other problems too.

One of the most striking examples of China’s selective diplomacy is its handling of the Rohingya crisis.

Since 2017, Bangladesh has been burdened with over a million Rohingya refugees fleeing Myanmar’s military crackdown.

Despite repeated Chinese assurances that it would facilitate repatriation, progress has been excruciatingly slow.

China’s unwillingness to exert significant pressure on Myanmar’s military junta—its key strategic ally—has only deepened frustrations in Dhaka.

China has brokered several agreements between Bangladesh and Myanmar on the Rohingya repatriation issue, but none have resulted in meaningful outcomes.

At the same time, Beijing continues to maintain covert ties with the Arakan Army, a powerful insurgent group operating in Myanmar’s Rakhine state.

This dual approach—supporting Myanmar’s military government while simultaneously engaging with rebel groups—raises concerns that China is more focused on maintaining influence than on resolving the crisis.

For Bangladesh, this is a delicate situation. While Dhaka needs China’s leverage over Myanmar to press for repatriation, it must also recognize that Beijing’s strategic interests in the region are unlikely to align with its own.

A more comprehensive diplomatic strategy—potentially involving India, ASEAN, and Western partners—could exert more pressure on China to take concrete action, rather than offering mere diplomatic assurances.

The Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic armed group in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, is fighting for greater autonomy for the Rakhine people.

In recent years, it has significantly strengthened its military capabilities, taking control of substantial territories after defeating Myanmar’s military, the Tatmadaw.

China’s relationship with the AA is multifaceted. While Beijing officially supports Myanmar’s central government, it has also maintained covert ties with the AA, likely to protect its strategic interests—particularly in the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a key part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

For Bangladesh, this dual engagement complicates the Rohingya crisis.

On the one hand, China’s influence over Myanmar’s junta could be used to pressure for repatriation.

On the other, Beijing’s connections with the AA suggest that its primary interest lies in ensuring stability in Rakhine State to safeguard its economic investments, rather than addressing the humanitarian crisis.

Furthermore, any government-to-government negotiations will likely require the AA’s involvement, further entrenching its role in the region’s geopolitics.

This dynamic places Bangladesh in a precarious position—reliant on China’s diplomatic influence to engage with Myanmar, yet wary of Beijing’s divided interests in the region.

It sure lacks the leverage to push Beijing into taking decisive action.

Striking balance is the key

So, for Bangladesh, the most effective approach is the one rooted in pragmatism.

While China offers crucial economic investment and military support, Washington and New Delhi remain essential to Bangladesh’s long-term security and regional stability.

Navigating this tightrope will require meticulous diplomacy, strategic foresight, and a commitment to preserving national sovereignty.

India, Bangladesh’s most immediate and influential neighbor, shares long borders and deep economic ties with Dhaka.

Despite recent tensions, security cooperation between the two countries remains vital.

New Delhi, however, views China’s growing presence in Bangladesh as a direct challenge to its regional leadership. So, Bangladesh must walk a fine line, avoiding alienation of India while taking advantage of Chinese investments for economic growth.

The US, under the renewed Trump administration, is expected to ramp up its containment strategy against China.

Washington has already indicated that it expects its allies, including Bangladesh, to align more closely with its Indo-Pacific strategy to counterbalance China’s influence.

This places Dhaka in a difficult position—while it benefits from American economic partnerships and security cooperation, it cannot afford to antagonize Beijing, its largest trading partner.

To effectively manage these tensions, Bangladesh must pursue a multi-vector foreign policy, engaging all three powers without becoming overly reliant on any single one.

Strengthening ties with ASEAN nations, the European Union, and Japan could provide alternative trade and investment opportunities, reducing dependence on a single geopolitical actor.

At the same time, Dhaka should bolster its regional security cooperation with India while ensuring that its economic ties with China do not translate into excessive strategic leverage for Beijing.

The primary challenge for Bangladesh will be maintaining its autonomy in decision-making.

Accepting Chinese investments should not come at the cost of sovereignty, just as aligning with the US should not mean joining a broader anti-China bloc.

Bangladesh’s success in this shifting geopolitical landscape will depend on its ability to remain neutral and independent, preserving its freedom to act in the best interests of its people.

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Adil Mahmood is a former journalist.