Electoral politics is a whole different ball game…here is why…

On August 5 of last year, in the wake of a massive uprising, Sheikh Hasina resigned and fled to India aboard an army helicopter. The streets, alleys, and corners of the country were flooded with demonstrators, many of whom were not just passive onlookers but actual voters of Hasina's own Awami League.

Eight months later, an international twist emerged: It was revealed that the United Nations had actually intervened during those tumultuous days, signaling the need for the army to step away from the field, with a clear warning that if they did not, peacekeeping forces, including Bangladesh's own, would be withdrawn.

This was not a new threat. In 2007, the One-Eleven incident had shown just how vulnerable the political system could be to military interventions, and it seemed that Bangladesh was on the cusp of a similar scenario in 2024.

What was different this time, however, was the sheer force and volume of the people’s involvement. Without millions of citizens flooding the streets, the UN’s intervention would not have been possible.

This puts the people at the heart of the August 5 uprising — they, not the army or political leaders, are the true heroes of this story.

Following the uprising, Bangladesh descended into chaos for a period. Police stations across the country shut down, weapons and ammunition went missing, and many officers lost their lives.

Amid this turmoil, the people of Bangladesh displayed remarkable resilience. They banded together, providing security for one another in a way few nations could under such circumstances.

It’s difficult to imagine a similar event in another country being met with the same level of grassroots solidarity and self-organization.

In the aftermath, a new government was formed under Dr. Muhammad Yunus, and the ensuing period saw a surge of mob justice. These groups, composed of ordinary citizens but with strong political inclinations, targeted individuals they deemed enemies of the people.

One of their first acts was to force the Chief Justice out of office. They also targeted educational institutions, forcing the dismissal of teachers in schools and colleges.

Interestingly, a substantial portion of these mobs was composed of Hindus, highlighting the complex and often religiously charged nature of the unrest. Meanwhile, another group, colloquially known as “Touhidi Janata,” rampaged through religious shrines, destroying around 60 across the country.

Amidst the growing chaos, questions arose about the role of the military and its relationship with the political process. The army came under increasing pressure to ban the Awami League, with some believing that the army chief was poised to make this decision, driven by the desire for an inclusive election.

Yet, this demand was misdirected. The authority to ban the Awami League rested with the Ministry of Home Affairs, not the army. The military did not have the power to issue such a decree. The pressure on the army created a level of confusion that clouded the situation further.

Dr. Yunus’s government, despite its strong stance on many issues, also made its position clear: they would not ban the Awami League. Yet, the contradiction remains. If the government had banned the Awami League and the military had intervened to prevent it, there would have been a legitimate reason to question the army’s involvement.

But the situation was not so straightforward, making the criticisms of the military's role in this context seem somewhat illogical.

This series of events, from the uprising to the subsequent civil unrest, however highlights the delicate balance of power in Bangladesh — between the military, the people, and political entities.

The military, under external pressure, has been cast into a more complex light, while the people have demonstrated both resilience and an ability to shape political outcomes. But at the end of the day, it is their will that will determine the fate of the nation.

While the military and political leaders may have their say, it is the people who have proven time and again that they are the true force behind Bangladesh’s political evolution.

The problem of banning a major party in Bangladesh

First, let’s consider the question: Is it even possible to ban the Awami League?

In short, yes and no. While banning political parties is legally possible, the reality is more complex. Consider Jamaat-e-Islami, which was banned after 1971 but reemerged. This pattern is not unique; it is a reality in politics.

Roughly 5% to 6% of the population supports Jamaat, and such a large demographic cannot simply be erased from society. The only scenario in which a political force like the Awami League could be entirely eliminated would require a revolution—one so profound that it would likely dismantle the entire military apparatus as well.

Just look at Syria, where the military has essentially ceased to exist, leading to the country’s collapse. The question, however, is whether Bangladesh’s military could remove such a party. The answer is clear: No. And since this is not a revolution, the idea of banning the Awami League remains largely irrelevant.

On February 25, the army chief issued a warning to the nation, cautioning that "if you throw mud at each other, the sovereignty of the country and nation will be jeopardized."

This statement should have been scrutinized more critically. Why did he speak out at that particular moment? Rather than responding with more aggression, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) chose a more prudent approach by refraining from intensifying their calls for elections and refraining from public protests.

Let’s examine some historical context. The first national election in Bangladesh occurred in 1973, where the Awami League received 73.20% of the vote and secured 293 seats. Other smaller parties, like the National Awami Party (NAP) led by Muzaffar, received a meager 8.32% of the vote but did not win any seats.

Meanwhile, the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) won just one seat, despite gaining 6.52% of the vote. There were allegations of electoral fraud during this period, particularly in the case of the NAP’s candidate in Bhola, who was reportedly forced out of the race to ensure a victory for Toffail Ahmed.

These irregularities, despite being criticized by foreign journalists, did not change the outcome—the Awami League still dominated the election, and the opposition remained fragmented.

The controversy surrounding the 1973 election was compounded by the fact that Jamaat-e-Islami and other Islamic parties had been banned. This made it difficult to gauge their true support, although, in the 1970 provincial elections, Jamaat received 4% of the vote, and in the national elections, their share increased slightly to over 6%.

In conclusion, while the idea of banning the Awami League might be raised in political discourse, it is neither a simple nor feasible solution. The historical evidence suggests that even with bans and irregularities, major political forces find ways to survive and thrive.

The real challenge lies not in prohibiting parties, but in understanding how to navigate Bangladesh’s complex political landscape.

Shifting dynamics and key players

The political landscape of Bangladesh has evolved dramatically over the years, with key elections shaping the power dynamics between major political parties. Here’s a breakdown of the key parliamentary elections, their results, and the shifting alliances:

In the 1979 Parliamentary Election the BNP emerged as the dominant party, securing 41.17% of the vote and winning 207 seats. The Awami League, which was divided into factions, received 24.56% of the vote and won 39 seats. Jamaat-e-Islami, which had reentered the political scene, did not contest under its own name but formed a new entity, the Islamic Democratic League, which aligned with the Bangladesh Muslim League.

This coalition received 10.07% of the vote and won 20 seats. The JSD (Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal) garnered 4.83% of the vote and won 8 seats, while the Mizan faction of the Awami League secured 2.78% of the vote and won 2 seats. Smaller left-wing parties, including NAP factions, collectively received around 5.5% of the vote.

In the 1986 Parliamentary Election, there was a notable shift, as BNP did not participate in the 1986 election. The Jatiya Party emerged as a major force, receiving 42.34% of the vote and winning 153 seats. The Awami League followed with 26.16% of the vote, securing 76 seats.

Jamaat-e-Islami, while still a significant player, received 4.16% of the vote and won 10 seats. Two factions of JSD collectively received 3.41% of the vote and won 5 seats. The CPB, despite contesting, failed to secure any seats, receiving just 0.91% of the vote.

The 1991 Parliamentary Election was  a close contest. BNP received 30.81% of the vote and won 140 seats, while the Awami League secured 30.08% and 88 seats. Jamaat-e-Islami made a notable gain with 12.13% of the vote and 18 seats.

The Jatiya Party received 11.92% and won 35 seats, while BAKSAL garnered 1.81% and 5 seats. The CPB, despite limited support (1.19%), won 5 seats. In this election, Sheikh Hasina's Awami League was confident of victory, especially given that BNP had not nominated strong candidates for all 300 seats.

Had the Awami League and JSD formed an alliance, along with the Jatiya Party, they might have gained the upper hand, similar to what transpired in the 2008 elections. However, the CPB was not part of the 2008 alliance.

In the 1996 Parliamentary Election the Awami League secured 37.44% of the vote and won 146 seats, while BNP received 33.61% and 116 seats.

The Jatiya Party won 32 seats with 11.61% of the vote, while Jamaat-e-Islami won 3 seats with 8.61% of the vote. Smaller parties like the JSD and Left secured around 1% of the vote and 1 seat, while the Islamic Unity Alliance (excluding Jamaat) also won 1 seat with 1.09% of the vote. In total, Islamic votes in this election amounted to just over 9%.

In the 2001 Parliamentary Election BNP secured 40.97% of the vote, winning 193 seats. The Awami League closely followed with 40.13% of the vote and 62 seats. An alliance between Jatiya Party and various Islamic parties garnered 7.25% of the vote and 14 seats.

Jamaat-e-Islami, although formally part of BNP’s alliance, received 8% of the vote, contributing to BNP's overall support. If we exclude Jamaat’s vote share, BNP’s core support is closer to 32%.

One of the key takeaways from this election is that the Awami League contested without a formal alliance but was only 0.84% behind BNP. This translates to a narrow gap of 668,462 votes.

Had the Awami League aligned with the Leftist factions and Jatiya Party’s Manjur, they would have likely won the election. This close margin seems to have propelled the Awami League toward forming multi-party alliances in future elections.

The 2008 election saw a major shift in the political landscape, with the Awami League winning 48.04% of the vote and 230 seats, while BNP received 32.5% and 30 seats. Despite an alliance with Jamaat, BNP’s vote share fell, prompting questions about where Jamaat’s votes went.

This drop in BNP's support can be attributed to shifting allegiances, with a significant portion of votes migrating to other parties, including the Awami League.

The Awami League’s performance in 2008 was in line with expectations, largely due to a surge in support from the Jatiya Party, Leftists, and JSD voters. Awami League's increasing support was evident, but post-2014 and 2024 elections raised concerns about the legitimacy of their vote share due to widespread irregularities.

Despite the increase in vote percentages, the actual support seemed to decrease in practice, especially after the 2011 elections, marking one of Awami League's worst performances.

However, even in those challenging times, they still managed to secure over 40% of the vote. Additionally, the weakening of Jatiya Party’s influence led to an influx of their voters into the Awami League fold, further bolstering its position.

The decline of Jatiya Party and Islamic votes

Both the Awami League and BNP have seen an increase in their vote share over time, while the Jatiya Party and Islamic votes have steadily declined. This has reinforced the two-party system in Bangladesh.

Had a third force been able to secure 12-15% of the vote, the outcome of elections could have been different. However, a critical question remains: where would these new votes come from, and to which party or alliance would they gravitate? This remains an open analysis.

Currently, the combined vote share of the Awami League and similar-minded forces is around 50%, while the remaining 50% represents the anti-Awami League bloc. Within this opposition, BNP holds a 40% share, with the remaining 10% coming from Islamist voters.

Interestingly, a large portion of BNP’s electorate is opposed to the Awami League, but they do not desire the complete disappearance of the Awami League's political influence, further adding to the complexity of Bangladesh’s political environment.

We have to understand the fact that the political landscape of Bangladesh has always been highly polarized, with divisions running deep. Looking at the numbers, it’s clear that certain groups, like Jamaat-e-Islami, may have small support in the grand scheme but still play a significant role.

Jamaat traditionally garnered around 4-6% of the vote during the Pakistan era, and despite efforts to eliminate them, they have returned. If a party that commands 40% of the vote, such as BNP, is banned, the consequences could be catastrophic.

The result would be a division of the country so sharp that it could mirror the chaos of the 1947 partition, but this time, the divide would seep into households, fracturing relationships between brothers, fathers, and sons. A deep and terrible chaos could arise within our homes.

One of the core issues here is leadership. As long as Sheikh Hasina is alive, no one in the Awami League—nor its voters—will accept anyone else as the leader of the party. There are growing doubts about whether the new Awami League faction coming forward truly represents the party’s essence, or if it is a mere façade.

These concerns only heighten when considering the deep attachment people have to their leaders, particularly in the context of political polarization.

The grave reality of political turmoil

A personal anecdote from early 2004 illustrates the intensity of this political environment. During a procession held by the Chhatra Dal, the student wing of BNP, the chants of "Khaleda Zia" echoed through Dhaka University.

The procession felt like a military parade—well-organized and disciplined—compared to the more fragmented nature of left-wing movements. Student leaders competed for the favor of Tarique Rahman, and the sense that the world was aligned with BNP was overwhelming.

At the same time, we were organizing rickshaw workers in Old Dhaka and Kamrangirchar, trying to bring attention to their issues.

However, during the height of BNP's power, Awami League’s labor organizations made it nearly impossible to establish any ground there. The political influence was undeniably with BNP. It was only later that I discovered Yunus, a leader from Awami League’s labor wing, who, despite his apparent humility, held little sway over the workers.

His inability to control the rickshaw garages or labor committees was a stark contrast to the grassroots political power that BNP had seized through local influence, small-scale extortion, and intimidation.

The lesson here is that to truly understand politics, one must recognize the power dynamics at play. By controlling local assets—like the tempo stands—BNP consolidated political power on the ground. It is through such means that they garnered support and maintained their presence.

The Leftists, by contrast, never managed to gain this kind of influence, which is why they struggled in elections. A party without the power to arbitrate disputes or maintain control over local politics will always be at a disadvantage, even in a fair election.

To illustrate the grave reality of this, let's take a look at the last election. In the January 7th election of last year, the scale of operation required to manage the process was staggering. There were 42,024 voting centers across the country, each with 261,912 booths.

To effectively manage voter lists or ensure agents were in place, each booth would require approximately 300,000 people. If the intention was to manipulate votes, a minimum of three people per booth would be needed, amounting to a staggering nine million individuals.

To control the entire election process across all centers, it would take at least 200 people per center, raising the total required personnel to around nine million. Additionally, for violence, bombings, and the display of weaponry, another specialized group would be necessary.

In total, the numbers would rise to twenty million people to carry out such operations. This includes at least 5,000 bomb makers strategically placed across districts to create explosions that, while loud and smoky, would cause minimal harm but be designed for maximum intimidation.

The question is, do those entering politics today fully grasp the magnitude of this? Simply appearing on television or making harsh speeches does not equate to true political acumen. Politics is about winning the hearts and minds of the people, not just engaging in performative acts.

The real danger lies in the destruction of critical institutions, particularly the military and the police. If both institutions are compromised or destroyed, there will be no force capable of handling the chaos.

The country could descend into the kind of devastation seen in Ukraine or Syria. We must avoid this scenario at all costs. Instead, let justice be swift and fair. Do not resort to mob rule or attempts to seize power, as this will lead to irreversible harm for everyone involved.

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Arifuzzaman Tuhin is a Dhaka-based journalist