Russian President Vladimir Putin arrives in New Delhi tomorrow on his first visit since the war in Ukraine began, and the discussions are expected to dance around a carefully curated set of strategic and contentious issues.

For decades, India’s relationship with Russia was strategic and military. Moscow equipped New Delhi’s armed forces long before Washington found South Asia geopolitically useful.

The Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971, signed in the thick of Bangladesh's Liberation War, established Russia as a security guarantor when the US and China tilted toward Pakistan.

That era cemented deep military-industrial ties between India and Russia—fighter jets from MiG, helicopters from Kamov, tanks designed in Russia and manufactured under Indian license.

Even after the Soviet collapse, India kept buying Russian arms and Russia kept treating India as a counterweight to China, while the West continued to see the subcontinent largely through the prism of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

That relationship later expanded economically. Russian crude was marginal in India’s energy mix before 2022—barely 1–2% of total imports. India bought oil primarily from the Gulf: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, UAE.

Then, Russia invaded Ukraine, and the West rolled out price caps, sanctions, secondary-sanctions, and moral crusades. Europe stopped buying Russian crude directly, but still needed energy.

India and a handful of refiners—led by Reliance Industries and state-owned Indian Oil—stepped into the breach, buying Russian oil at deep discounts, refining it, and selling it onward… including back to Europe.

The result was an arbitrage mechanism that was so efficient that Western policymakers pretended not to notice until late 2024. Europe was still consuming Russian oil—it just passed through Jamnagar.

India’s oil purchases were made openly, with clear visibility and even quiet encouragement from both Washington and European capitals.

Of the $85.9 billion in refined petroleum exported from Reliance’s Jamnagar refinery between February 2023 and July 2025, 42 percent went to countries that publicly sanction Russia. The U.S. and Europe alone accounted for roughly one-third of that total—about $19.7 billion.

Likewise, 55 percent of Russia’s seaborne oil exports in June 2025 were shipped on tankers owned by G-7 countries. The proportion of Russian oil carried on G-7 vessels actually rose—jumping from 36 percent in January 2025 to 56 percent in June 2025.

The overarching reality is stark. Western governments wanted to preserve the appearance of a hard line against Moscow while continuing to benefit from discounted energy and crucial supplies.

India, with its unique diplomatic credibility and access to both blocs, became the indispensable intermediary that made this balancing act possible.

The Indian perspective

Buying discounted Russian crude however has been profitable for India not just in macroeconomic terms—balancing inflation and reducing import costs—but in geopolitical terms.

It demonstrated that India could chart its own course rather than serve as a passive consumer of Western policy.

But the honeymoon period did not last. As secondary sanctions expanded, US and EU pressure mounted. Several refiners recalibrated their purchases. Reliance—one of the biggest processors of Russian crude—reduced imports to its export-oriented refinery.

The public commentary around these cuts has grown louder, and a growing narrative is being promoted from both Washington and Brussels: that India must “choose a side.”

India’s point of view is obviously different. It did not create the Russia-Ukraine crisis. It has long maintained strategic autonomy. It buys arms from Russia, trades with the EU, engages the U.S., and attempts to manage an assertive China on its border.

In this context, importing Russian oil has been less a moral question than a pragmatic one for India as it needs affordable energy for a growing economy.

The US meanwhile wants India as a counterweight to China, but insists on constraining India’s freedom of economic maneuver. It also wants India to be part of a “democratic coalition” against autocracies, yet still refuses full technological transfer in strategic defense areas.

Europe wants a deeper strategic partnership and talks excitedly about an EU-India Free Trade Agreement, yet publicly warns India about “Russian oil detours.”

China, meanwhile, presents its own long-term threat—in the Himalayas, in the Indian Ocean, in digital ecosystems—but has also strengthened its ties to Moscow.

The chessboard is crowded, and India believes that it cannot afford to be a pawn.

One cannot ignore pure economics here. Russian oil came at an aggressive discount—often $10–$15 below Brent benchmark. For a country of 1.4 billion people, every percentage shift in crude price ripples through inflation, transportation costs, and public sentiment.

The cheap oil allowed the Indian government to hold down domestic fuel prices during a period of global volatility—especially after the Ukraine war sent markets spinning. It was more of a necessity than a hedge.

But the sanctions regime changed the calculation. In 2025, US enforcement tightened against Russian energy companies including Rosneft and Lukoil, complicating financial transactions and threatening secondary sanctions against intermediaries and third-party buyers.

Reliance had to adjust. State-owned Indian Oil became more cautious. And suddenly, India’s autonomy was not only tested—it was implicitly challenged. The U.S. expects compliance; India sees this as pressure.

Europe has also been publicly chiding India on Russian crude. Western diplomats demand moral clarity—yet continue buying refined petroleum that originated as Russian crude.

The contradiction is glaring. When India buys Russian oil cheaply, Washington is indignant. But when Europe ends up consuming that same oil after Indian refineries process it, Brussels shrugs with technical neutrality.

Western nations want India to shoulder the ethical burden while they free-ride on India’s industrial intermediating. This is essentially outsourcing of guilt.

Complex geopolitical balance

Yet India cannot simply defy the West indefinitely. Its economy still requires access to Western financial systems, Western markets, Western technology, Western investment.

It wants deeper ties with the EU, from green energy to digital cooperation. It wants security collaboration with the US, especially in the Indo-Pacific where the China question looms existentially.

And in navigating these multiple relationships, India ironically finds itself diplomatically exposed—between a rock and a hard place.

The deeper issue is strategic coherence. India does not want to simply be anti-China or pro-U.S. or nostalgically pro-Russia. Its future hinges on multipolarity. But multipolarity is expensive. It requires balancing competing pressures.

The West wants India to punish Russia economically. China wants India contained and encircled, using both Pakistan and maritime influence. Russia wants India to remain loyal and dependent.

And India wants to remain sovereign and opportunistic: buying cheap oil when possible, rejecting pressure when necessary, and leveraging partnerships when useful.

The year 2022 forced a shift in global order. The historical arc of energy geopolitics—once defined by OPEC and Atlantic financial networks—was punctured by the Ukraine war.

The sanctions regime inadvertently pushed Russia closer to China, strengthened the BRICS narrative, and legitimized alternative financial channels beyond the dollar.

If the dollar loses dominance, India stands to gain flexibility. If the Western sanctions regime continues tightening, India may have to fully decouple from Russian energy.

Either way, this moment is defining—not just for India’s energy policy, but for its future political identity.

India’s best path forward is probably the preservation of strategic autonomy. That autonomy will require a pragmatic mix of shifting refineries, diversified import sources, stronger engagement with Middle Eastern producers, and assertive diplomacy that tells both Washington and Brussels the truth that India will not sacrifice domestic economic stability on the altar of Western moral theater.

Importing Russian oil benefitted India because it gave the country breathing room when global energy prices spiked. It protected India’s inflation shield. It served the interests of its citizens, not its allies.

The U.S. and EU pressure may eventually force India to recalibrate purchases—but India will not publicly bend its knee. Because the era when Western powers could dictate energy decisions to a post-colonial nation has ended.

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