The reputations of agencies like Mossad, the CIA and MI6 have been built over decades of quiet interventions and high-stakes operations. Their histories are filled with stories of governments destabilized, leaders removed and political orders reshaped in ways that served strategic interests far from their own borders.

Their officers are trained to be precise and, when necessary, ruthless. Yet there is one country where this formidable machinery of intelligence repeatedly encounters limits: Iran.

For years, these agencies have pursued influence inside Iran through a range of covert activities. They have recruited informants, attempted to cultivate insiders within key institutions and, at times, carried out targeted killings of scientists and military figures tied to sensitive programs.

There have been persistent reports of plots aimed at destabilizing the leadership, including attempts to undermine or even remove Ali Khamenei. And yet, despite these efforts, the system they have sought to weaken remains intact, even resilient.

This apparent contradiction raises a larger question. Why do intelligence organizations that have succeeded in altering political trajectories elsewhere struggle so consistently in Iran?

The answer lies less in operational shortcomings than in the structure of the Iranian state itself, which has been deliberately designed to withstand precisely this kind of pressure.

To understand that design, it is necessary to revisit a defining moment in Iran’s modern history.

In 1953, the government of Mohammad Mossadegh was overthrown in a coup backed by the United States and Britain. Mossadegh had moved to nationalize Iran’s oil industry, challenging foreign control over one of the country’s most valuable resources.

In response, intelligence agencies orchestrated a campaign that combined propaganda, political manipulation and the mobilization of unrest. Mossadegh was removed, and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was restored to power.

Moments of reckoning

The episode left a deep imprint on Iran’s political consciousness.

It demonstrated not only the reach of foreign intelligence services but also the vulnerabilities within Iran’s own institutions that made such intervention possible.

When the Islamic Republic emerged after the 1979 revolution, its architects were determined to ensure that no similar operation could succeed again.

What they constructed was not a simple hierarchy but a layered system of overlapping authorities. At its apex stands the Supreme Leader, but even this position is subject to oversight by the Assembly of Experts, a body of clerics elected by the public.

This institution holds the power to appoint and, if necessary, dismiss the leader, creating a mechanism of supervision that complicates any attempt to concentrate power in a single figure.

Alongside this religious authority exists an elected political structure. Iran’s president and its parliament, the Majles, are chosen through national elections, though candidates must first be approved by the Guardian Council.

This council, composed of clerics and jurists, ensures that legislation aligns with both constitutional principles and Islamic law. When disagreements arise between parliament and the council, they are referred to the Expediency Discernment Council, which acts as a mediator.

The result is a system in which power is distributed across multiple institutions, each capable of checking the others.

This diffusion makes it exceedingly difficult for any single faction, whether domestic or foreign-backed, to seize control. A political conspiracy that gains traction in one branch is likely to encounter resistance in another.

The structure is not designed for efficiency; it is designed for endurance.

If the political system resists manipulation, what of the military? In many countries, control of the armed forces has been the decisive factor in coups.

Iran, however, has addressed this vulnerability as well. Its military is divided into two distinct entities: the regular army, known as the Artesh, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC.

The latter was created specifically to protect the revolutionary system, including from threats that might arise within the conventional military itself.

This dual structure introduces a built-in rivalry that serves as a safeguard. The IRGC answers directly to the Supreme Leader and operates with significant autonomy, including influence in economic and foreign policy spheres.

Any attempt to mobilize the regular army for a coup would likely be countered by the IRGC, and vice versa. The existence of parallel forces complicates coordination for any would-be plotters.

Ingrained resilience

The system’s resilience does not end there.

The IRGC itself contains multiple branches with distinct roles and chains of command, reducing the likelihood of unified action against the state. Beneath it operates the Basij, a vast paramilitary network composed of volunteers drawn from across society.

The Basij functions as both a security force and a mechanism of social control, capable of mobilizing quickly in response to perceived threats.

For external intelligence agencies, this architecture presents a formidable challenge. Recruiting individual agents or influencing isolated actors is possible, and such efforts have occurred. But translating those gains into systemic change is another matter entirely.

The network of institutions, with their overlapping loyalties and responsibilities, is designed to absorb shocks and neutralize disruptions.

This helps explain why targeted operations, including assassinations and sabotage, have not produced broader political change. They may disrupt specific programs or remove key individuals, but they do not unravel the system itself.

The structure endures because it is not dependent on any single node.

The persistence of Iran’s political order in the face of sustained pressure reflects a lesson learned decades ago. The memory of 1953 shaped a governing philosophy that prioritizes resilience over simplicity.

By embedding checks within checks and dividing authority across multiple centers, Iran has created a state that is difficult to penetrate and even harder to overturn.

This does not mean the system is without weaknesses or internal tensions. Like any political structure, it faces challenges, both from within and from the broader international environment.

But its design makes it resistant to the kinds of interventions that have succeeded elsewhere.

In discussions of Iran’s global position, attention often centers on its strategic capabilities, including its nuclear ambitions. Yet an equally significant source of its durability lies in its institutional design. The complexity of its governance is not an accident; it is a defense mechanism, forged in response to a history of Foreign interference and refined over decades.

For intelligence agencies accustomed to operating in more permeable environments, Iran represents a different kind of problem. It is not simply a target but a system built to withstand targeting.

And that, more than any single operation or miscalculation, explains why some of the world’s most capable intelligence services have found their limits there.

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Mahmud Bin Morshad is the Program officer of Department of Political Science and Sociology (PSS), North South University