On November 30, 2023, Shahjahan Omor, a former leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) who later became a Member of Parliament for the Awami League (AL), called a press conference to announce his candidacy for the upcoming 12th General Election.

The spectacle that followed, however, was anything but ordinary. As the conference progressed, a journalist attempted to ask Omor a question about the Trinamool BNP and BNM, two smaller political factions.

Omor, visibly irritated, dismissed the inquiry with a sharp retort: “Rubbish! These are just nonsensical parties; they sell themselves for 2-3 crore taka.”

Omor’s comments, which derided rival factions as opportunistic and for sale to the highest bidder, were starkly political. But they were also personal.

After all, Omor, who had spent 45 years at the heart of BNP leadership since the party’s founding, was now casting aside decades of loyalty to align himself with the ruling Awami League.

What made his defection all the more striking was the timing: Omor had been arrested just weeks earlier, on November 5, 2023, in connection with an arson case.

After spending 25 days in custody, he was granted bail, a move that immediately raised eyebrows. His release was followed by his dramatic exit from the BNP, a decision that seemed too coordinated to be mere coincidence.

Some speculated that negotiations between Omor and the ruling AL had taken place during his time behind bars, leading to his quick departure from the opposition party.

On the same day, key BNP leaders were reportedly denying his bail petition, deepening the mystery of Omor’s sudden shift in allegiance.

In his press conference, Omor boasted of his ability to directly approach AL leadership for a nomination, a privilege he claimed others lacked.

He was careful to draw a sharp contrast between himself and those he derided as part of “kings’ parties” — the smaller, more fragmented groups he dismissed as irrelevant.

This boast was not just about political maneuvering; it was a pointed statement about the shifting balance of power in Bangladesh, one that reflected a deeper, more strategic realignment ahead of the 12th General Election.

The election, which took place on January 7, 2024, would mark a historic moment: AL’s fourth consecutive victory, a feat unprecedented in Bangladesh’s political history.

For those of us who follow the country’s political drama closely, this outcome was both expected and yet deeply unsettling. The path to AL’s foruth-term victory was paved with new strategies, unexpected defections, and, most notably, an increasing trend of political realignments that will shape the future of Bangladesh’s political realm.

This election, more than any other, felt like a moment of reckoning—a reflection of how power is shifting in ways that will continue to haunt the country’s political landscape in the years to come.

As the dust settles from the tumultuous events surrounding the 12th General Election, one thing is clear: Bangladesh’s political future will be defined not just by who holds power, but by the ever-evolving nature of allegiance, betrayal, and the high stakes of political survival.

For those of us who follow the twists and turns of this drama, it is a story that will remain embedded in the political psyche for generations.

The politics behind: Allegations of coercion and political maneuvering

There are more stories within the run-up to Bangladesh’s 12th General Election that demand closer scrutiny.

Syed Muhammad Ibrahim, better known as General (Retired) Ibrahim, made a striking announcement on November 22, 2023—he would be running in the election under the banner of the ruling Awami League (AL), despite his party, Kalyan Party, being a member of the BNP-led 20-party alliance and an active participant in the anti-government movement.

This sudden shift from a staunch opposition figure to an election candidate aligned with the ruling government came as a shock.

However, the real story isn’t simply Ibrahim’s defection; it’s the troubling allegations that have surfaced regarding the pressures placed on local leaders in his electoral district.

In late December 2023, the Election Commission (EC) received a letter signed by 17 chairmen of Chakaria and Pekua upazilas and union parishads.

The letter contained alarming claims of threats of abduction and coercion directed at these local officials. They stated they were being pressured to support Ibrahim, who was the Kalyan Party’s candidate for the area.

The sources of this pressure, they claimed, were agents of a "special intelligence agency"—a direct implication of government interference.

Yet, despite the gravity of these claims, the Election Commission took no action. There was no public statement, no formal inquiry, and no visible effort to address the matter with government officials or other relevant stakeholders.

The lack of a response only fueled suspicions of a political system where power and influence are leveraged behind the scenes, undeterred by accountability.

Meanwhile, another layer of intrigue unfolded within the Jatiyo Party (JaPa). On August 23, 2023, GM Qader, the party chairman, returned from a trip to India and faced the press at the airport.

When asked about his meetings in Delhi, he offered no details, citing the need for Indian consent.

This unusual lack of transparency stirred speculation and led to widespread debate. For months, Qader remained out of the public eye, and uncertainty loomed over his participation in the election.

Then, on November 22, 2023, JaPa officially announced its participation, though the picture was still clouded with ambiguity.

On December 17, 2023, the final day for withdrawing candidacies, it was revealed that GM Qader had pulled his name from the race in Dhaka-17.

Yet, in a dramatic twist, the Jatiyo Party went on to announce that it would field a total of 287 candidates in the election, with Qader himself running from Lalmonirhut-3.

Some journalists reported that Qader had met with intelligence officials just before making his decision to withdraw his candidacy, adding an extra layer of suspicion to his sudden reversal.

Although a leading newspaper ran the story, it was later removed without explanation, raising further questions about the influence of powerful figures behind the scenes.

These political dramas illustrate how the run-up to the 12th General Election has been marked by shifting alliances, covert negotiations, and pressures that many believe have shaped the outcome in ways that go beyond democratic norms.

The most profound change began on October 28, 2023, when nearly all of BNP’s top leaders were arrested on charges linked to political cases across the country.

Then, Dr. Abdur Razzaq, the agriculture minister at the time and a senior leader of the ruling Awami League, made a controversial statement.

Speaking about the BNP’s decision not to participate in the election, he claimed that the party had been told by the Election Commission that if they agreed to join the polls, the election schedule would be delayed and BNP leaders would be granted bail.

His words implied that the government had used the threat of imprisonment and the promise of release as leverage to pressure the opposition into participating in a highly contentious election.

This statement, which stirred outrage, seemed to confirm the BNP’s long-held allegations that their leaders had been arrested solely for political reasons.

While AL General Secretary Obaidul Quader later dismissed Razzaq's comments as a "personal statement," the damage had already been done.

Vulnerabilities of democratic framework

As the election drew closer, the political landscape grew increasingly murky.

The manipulation of local leaders, the unclear motives behind candidacy decisions, and the reported use of government power to influence opposition participation painted a disturbing picture of Bangladesh’s electoral process.

What’s unfolding is a political drama that will likely resonate for years to come—one that raises fundamental questions about the nature of democracy, coercion, and the role of power in shaping the country’s future.

The above-mentioned candiate’s sudden political shift and the allegations of coercion involving government intelligence agencies, illuminates a larger, more troubling narrative: the vulnerabilities in the country's democratic framework.

The role of two crucial state institutions—the judiciary and the intelligence agencies—has never been more evident in this election cycle.

While definitive conclusions remain elusive, the events themselves are undeniable, and their significance for the future of Bangladesh’s political landscape cannot be overstated.

At first glance, these stories might seem disjointed: the sudden defections and questionable tactics employed by political figures on the one hand, and the allegations of government interference and coercion on the other.

But taken together, they point to a broader pattern of dysfunction and manipulation that plagues the political system.

In many ways, these events mark a shift in how power is brokered in Bangladesh—where the reach of the state extends far beyond the formal political sphere, and the judiciary and intelligence agencies are drawn into the heart of electoral maneuvering.

Drawing conclusions about the historical context or ethical dimensions of these incidents is a matter of debate.

Yet, what is irrefutable is the impact they will have on future political and academic analysis. These events reveal the deep-seated weaknesses of Bangladesh's democracy, which has remained unstable for decades.

The unresolved political settlement, which leaves opposition parties sidelined or silenced, is the root cause of the system’s dysfunction. It’s a flaw that continues to hinder the country’s democratic progress, creating fertile ground for manipulation and strategic power plays.

As we look ahead, the shifting political landscape demands introspection. The unfolding drama has provided valuable lessons, not only for political parties and the public but also for the institutions that are meant to safeguard democracy.

The judiciary, which is supposed to uphold the rule of law, and the intelligence agencies, whose primary role should be national security, have become instruments of political power in this election cycle.

The question now is: how can these institutions be reformed to ensure that they serve the public interest and not merely the interests of the powerful?

For Bangladesh to move beyond the turmoil that has plagued its democracy for so long, it is essential for political leaders, civil society, and other stakeholders to learn from these events.

A more resilient political system must be built—one that can withstand the pressures of political maneuvering and the abuse of power.

Only then will the country be able to address its current challenges and create a healthier, more robust democratic environment for future generations.

Until that happens, the shadows of these recent events will continue to haunt Bangladesh’s political future.

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Mahtab Uddin Chowdhury is an independent researcher specialising in South Asian politics, local governance and media freedom.