Over the past three months, economist Jyoti Rahman, Professor Asif Shahan, Hasib Uddin Hossain from Rashtrachinta, Fahim Mashrur from Voice for Reform and I have been deeply engaged in developing reform proposals.

We were joined by numerous others from the Nagorik Coalition and beyond in this effort.

Every day, we conducted detailed analyses of various provisions in different proposals, drawing on international examples and references. We consulted a range of experts, including Professor Ridwanul Hoque of Dhaka University, and spent hours in Zoom meetings. We also held multiple discussions with the BNP, Jamaat, and NCP.

We have engaged with various commissions, and they have all acknowledged the depth and rigor of our work. I can say with confidence that the Unity Commission has incorporated many of our proposals into their consensus position–precisely because we challenged their initial views with sound academic and technical arguments.

In light of this experience, Professor Muhammad Yunus’s statement that “if there are more reforms, elections will be held in June; if fewer reforms, then in December” seems misleading.

I’m not sure how they will respond if political parties–confused by such messaging–accuse the government of clinging to power, potentially triggering a political crisis.

The core issue with this argument is its assumption that certain reforms, even if broadly agreed upon, cannot be implemented by December 2025, but somehow can be completed by June 2026.

That logic is flawed. There is no reform agenda that could feasibly be completed in June 2026 but not in December 2025. The claim simply does not hold up.

The reforms we've been working on over the past three months can broadly be divided into two categories–but neither offers any valid justification for delaying the upcoming election.

Analysis of proposed reforms

On one hand, there are reforms that do not require constitutional amendments. These include measures that can be enacted through administrative decisions, government circulars, ordinances, or coordinated action across ministries.

If there is political consensus, these changes can begin immediately–not in December or June, but as soon as next week. There's nothing structurally or legally preventing their rapid implementation.

On the other hand, there are reforms that do require constitutional amendments or the passage of laws through parliament. These, by definition, depend on the existence of an elected parliament.

In such cases, rather than serving as a reason to delay the election, the election itself becomes a prerequisite for moving forward. Without a functioning legislature, these reforms cannot even begin to take shape.

Beyond these two categories lies a broader set of long-term structural reforms–issues that demand budgetary allocations, changes in administrative staffing, and engagement with multiple stakeholders across sectors.

But if the government is serious about these, are they preparing to include them in the upcoming national budget?

If not, it’s clear that such reforms won’t even begin before the 2026 fiscal year. In short, pointing to reform as a reason for election delay simply doesn’t hold up under scrutiny.

So, what is the realistic and constructive path forward for implementing the reform proposals we’ve all worked so hard on?

At this stage, what’s needed most is a transparent, coordinated process grounded in political will. The major parties must come together–sit across the table, openly, within a defined timeline–and work out a common, actionable reform package.

It’s an entirely doable step. Once a consensus is reached, the reforms that don’t require constitutional amendments can be enacted right away, through ordinances or administrative orders.

There is no technical or legal barrier to prevent this from happening immediately.

Mandate for the long-term reforms

For reforms that do require constitutional changes, the solution is also clear: elections must be held without delay. Only an elected parliament has the legitimacy and authority to pass such legislation.

In other words, far from being a reason to postpone elections, these reforms actually depend on the election taking place as soon as possible.

If all political actors can agree on a roadmap–one that aligns reform implementation with a timely election schedule–it could offer a meaningful way out of the current impasse.

And frankly, I fail to see why Professor Yunus would take issue with this. There’s nothing egotistical in sitting down to solve a national crisis.

What we should really be asking is this: why have none of the 50 pages of reform proposals, submitted by the commissions three months ago and deemed immediately actionable, seen any progress?

Not one step has been taken. Meanwhile, there’s been no serious investigation into the killings, the use of live ammunition, or the excessive force by police during the protests. Which commission is responsible for addressing those crimes?

And as for Professor Yunus’s curious logic–that “fewer reforms mean elections in December, more reforms mean elections in June”--where did this idea come from?

I would genuinely like to have a public discussion with whoever advised him on this. Because what’s happening now is absurd: reforms are being falsely pitted against elections, as if one must come at the cost of the other.

It’s a false dilemma–and a dangerous one.

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Zia Hassan is a writer and analyst