The Modi–Xi meeting on the sidelines of the SCO summit in Tianjin is drawing scrutiny in New Delhi as well as in Washington, Brussels and beyond.

Every handshake between these two leaders reverberates across the global order. Some argue that India, cornered by an increasingly fragile relationship with Washington, is being nudged to seek Beijing’s favor–even if it means diluting its core concerns on China.

Others speculate that Tianjin could mark the beginning of a new bargain, one so fundamental that it might overturn a quarter-century of India’s partnership with America.

But to view this meeting as a grand re-alignment is to miss the forest for the trees. This was essentially not a geopolitical earthquake, but a continuation of a process revived in October 2024 at the BRICS summit in Kazan, after four years of silence.

Modi and Xi are not inventing new ground–they are possibly retracing steps once taken by every Indian prime minister since Rajiv Gandhi, who all sought stable and predictable ties with China.

That goal has been repeatedly tested–most recently by China’s 2020 aggression in Ladakh, especially the bloodshed in Galwan. India’s posture since then has been clear: until the standoff along the Line of Actual Control was resolved, normal ties would remain frozen.

By late 2024, both sides claimed to have reached a “mutually satisfactory” resolution to the Ladakh impasse. On October 23, Modi and Xi announced the reopening of dialogue channels.

Since then, a slow thaw has followed: cultural exchanges resumed, visas liberalized, cross-border data-sharing reinstated, and direct flights restored.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s recent visit to Delhi only underlined that this process is real, if fragile. Seen in this light, Tianjin was less about dramatic resets and more about keeping the re-engagement alive.

For India, the calculus is clear. If Washington can renegotiate its alliances in pursuit of naked self-interest, why should New Delhi not do the same?

To reduce this to a binary choice–between China or the United States–is to ignore the ‘pragmatic streak’ in India’s foreign policy.

Modi’s government, like those before it, seeks room to maneuver. The more interesting question is not whether India will tilt toward Beijing, but how it can hedge between competing giants while still safeguarding its own sovereignty.

The greater optic

From Dhaka, the view is instructive. South Asia has long been the stage where great power games collide, often at the expense of smaller neighbors.

The Tianjin meeting is a reminder that India is now playing the balancing act on a far larger canvas. Whether this produces stability or simply another cycle of mistrust depends less on handshakes in hotel rooms, and more on whether leaders in Delhi and Beijing have the discipline to look beyond the next skirmish.

But to suggest that India and China are on the cusp of full trust would be naïve. The atmospherics may have improved, but the fundamentals remain unsettled.

New Delhi’s own statements following Wang Yi’s visit made clear that lingering doubts still dominate the relationship.

Agreements to discuss principles for de-escalation along the Line of Actual Control, to create mechanisms to prevent future clashes, and to reopen dialogue on the boundary question are less signs of resolution than reminders of how much remains unresolved.

Beijing, too, has yet to prove that words can be matched with deeds.

If China is serious, it must show this through tangible steps: opening markets to Indian agricultural goods, pharmaceuticals, and IT services; ensuring unimpeded supply of critical inputs to Indian industries; and refraining from the weaponization of trade through informal sanctions. Until then, trust will remain elusive.

India has also been careful to frame its diplomacy in broader terms.

The repeated emphasis on building not just a multipolar world but a multipolar Asia is a subtle reminder that China cannot monopolize the Indo-Pacific narrative.

For any real reset to take hold, Beijing must accept India’s role in the region. Without that acknowledgment, there is no inevitability of a “new chapter.” These are still early days, and New Delhi knows it.

The US question

What this does not mean, however, is that rapprochement with China spells the end of India’s strategic partnership with the United States.

That assumption–peddled by some MAGA extremists in Washington–is both simplistic and ahistorical. India is not a transactional power trading favors for short-term gain.

It is a civilizational state with long horizons. Its engagement with the United States after the Cold War was never about expediency but about shaping a durable partnership.

Of course, recent rhetoric from members of Donald Trump’s administration has frayed some of that trust. Rebuilding confidence will demand political will on both sides, not least a renewed focus on shared interests rather than divisive grievances.

But the bedrock of the Indo-U.S. relationship remains strong. Both are democracies, pluralistic societies, and defenders of a free Indo-Pacific. Those commonalities are not easily undone.

Seen from Dhaka, the lesson however is clear. India is attempting what world powers have always done: managing parallel relationships without reducing them to a zero-sum game.

It is entirely possible–though far from easy–for New Delhi to sustain a strategic partnership with Washington while also crafting a stable modus vivendi with Beijing.

The balancing act is fraught, but it reflects a deeper truth: in today’s fractured world, survival belongs to those who can hedge without surrendering their core.

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Md Sazzad Amin is Bangla Outlook’s Chief Geopolitical Columnist