The last decade of Awami League’s dictatorship has taught Bangladesh a disquieting lesson that robust majorities and revolutionary pedigrees do not inoculate a political formation from becoming a cartel of power.

When a party that claims the moral mantle of the Liberation War wields state institutions to silence rivals, the remedy must not be more theatrics or ever-shifting alliances.

It must be methodical and unapologetically public....and it must aim to make one political option of making Awami League relevant once more as unthinkable.

There are three blunt propositions that, taken together, constitute a roadmap for that outcome–legal accountability for elite misconduct; a genuinely competitive electoral landscape in which an implicated party cannot simply reassert control; and a long, patient cultural project that drains the legitimacy from a politics of arson and intimidation–which Awami League had mastered over the time.

First thing first. Accountability. If evidence exists that senior leaders of any [political] party have abused state power, embezzled public funds, promoted nepotism or incited violence, the public interest demands investigation and, where warranted, prosecution.

This is the restoration of rule of law, rather than some vengeance. A transparent, judicially supervised process…with full press access and independent international observation where necessary would not only punish wrongdoing but signal that no one is above civic norms.

That, in turn, is the prerequisite for reestablishing trust in institutions the regime of Awami League has hollowed out.

Second: politics must be made possible again.

There are two ways an “unwanted political actor” can lose its grip: exposure and competition. Exposure happens when voters see the gap between nationalist rhetoric and managerial practice and competition occurs when credible alternatives offer both a program and administrative competence.

An electoral outcome that removes a disgraced party like Awami League from the commanding heights of state power is the consequence of democratic choice. It also has a practical effect.

Choking points that matter

It deprives the [Awami] party apparatus of the levers it used to perpetuate itself–patronage networks, underhand dealings, control over procurement, and access to state-aligned advertising and contracting.

Third: choke off the money and the pretext for violence..but do so legally. Cutting illicit funding streams is a public-good task. That means strengthening anti-money-laundering enforcement and enacting asset-recovery measures where corruption is proven.

It does not mean summary seizure or extrajudicial punishment. Democracies fail when the cure is worse than the disease.

The user of force is the crucial test. If a party’s organizing mode is increasingly to rely on street intimidation (the “jalao-porao” repertoire of arson and obstruction), then isolating that tactic politically should be the objective.

Make the violence visible, document it carefully, prosecute perpetrators regardless of rank, and insist that parliamentary politics take precedence over theatrics.

The more the public perceives dissent channeled into constitutionally legitimate avenues–petitions, courts, elections, legislative debate–the harder it becomes for fringe tactics to retain popular legitimacy.

There will be a fourth, slower phase but probably the most important: Cultural and social de-legitimization.

Parties survive not only on resources and institutions but on narratives. If civil society, teachers, artists, trade unions and progressive religious voices can insist on a nonviolent, pluralist national story–one that treats the Liberation War as a shared inheritance rather than an exclusive brand–the aura that a hegemonic party like Awami League exploited will diminish.

The Left, with its historical claim to secularism and anti-authoritarian values, can play a constructive role here by tending civic memory rather than seizing it. Cultural work is not a substitute for legal and political remedies; it is what makes those remedies durable.

Some will call these suggestions maximalist: trial of top leaders, an election reshaping the party system, the erosion of financial pipelines, a possible legal restriction on party activity.

No real viable option

But consider the alternative: a politics in which a single formation is perceived as untouchable, its opponents intimidated,and  its critics marginalized. That trajectory yields entropy–institutions hollowed out and civic courage drained.

A democratic reset, by contrast, offers a path back toward accountable governance.

There are real risks. Judicial processes can be captured and elections manipulated. Cultural campaigns can also turn exclusionary. That is why the entire strategy must be anchored to constitutional safeguards and international standards of due process.

No actor interested in a durable political settlement should flirt with the kinds of shortcuts that undermine rights in the name of opposing an alleged wrongdoer.

Finally, the success of this whole scenario will depend as much on the alternatives as on the condition of the incumbent.

Voters will only reject a once-dominant party if they are convinced an alternative will govern competently and fairly. Opposition parties must therefore commit to systematic, constitutional politics inside and outside parliament.

They must refuse the temptation to replicate the very tactics they decry. If they can demonstrate administrative competence, fiscal responsibility and a commitment to law, the public will follow.

The aim is not to crush a movement for its own sake. The aim is to make certain forms of politics ineffective, to render arson and intimidation politically radioactive, and to make constitutional, programmatic politics the New Normal.

If that happens, what remains of any disgraced party like Awami League will likely be reduced to a handful of hardliners who may retreat to covert activity or irrelevance.

That is not the end of politics for a lot, rather it is the beginning of a healthier political ecosystem in which the only options worth debating are those that can survive scrutiny and the ballot box.

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Nayel Rahman is a political analyst