In December 2015, following an extensive review and research, officials of the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission (BAEC) were preparing to sign a contract for the construction of the Rooppur nuclear power plant with Russia for $8 billion. Unexpectedly, the Ministry of Science and Technology announced that the contract price had been fixed at $12.65 billion. One must wonder whose interests were served by this increase. Will the contract price remain at $12.65 billion? Currently, additional contracts are being added, such as off-site water supply, laboratory construction, and alarm systems, which are further inflating the total cost.

Moreover, various projects like Green City (approximately Tk 2,000 crore), PPS under implementation by Bangladesh Army (Tk 3,450 crore), renovation and construction of railway lines with signaling for the Rooppur nuclear power plant (Tk 335.97 crore), and an external telecommunication network system by BTCL (Tk 380 crore) are being added periodically.

The railway line with signaling has been constructed for the Rooppur nuclear power plant, but it has not been used even for a single day. Allegedly, a former secretary of the Ministry of Science and Technology, manufacturing companies, and railway officials embezzled funds from this project. In addition, despite the proximity of Ishwardi Upazila Health Complex and Pabna Medical College and Hospital, a project for a Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant Community Hospital and Emergency First Aid Center has been initiated at a cost of Tk 1,133 crore. There has been widespread news about the pillow scandal in the Green City built for the Russian workers on the project, but the most significant embezzlement occurred with the materials for the buildings. These structures typically have a warranty of 50-80 years. However, they are now showing signs of decay, despite being in use for only 7-8 years. All the fire-extinguishing systems in the 20-story building are non-functional. In some buildings, elevators have broken down, and solar panels on the roof have deteriorated. When approached about these issues, an official of the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission in charge of Green City mentioned that Public Works are reviewing the problems, but no handover has occurred from Public Works. When asked why they have not been handed over after 7-8 years of use, he could not provide a satisfactory response.

The agreement with the Russian company Atomstroyexport for $12.65 billion requires Bangladesh to start repaying the loan from 2027. Bangladesh will have to pay more than $20 billion in state credit, a figure that is likely to rise. To date, the project's progress is about 62%, which is below the expected level. High-ranking officials of Atomstroyexport, responsible for the project's implementation, have been implicated in corruption within the Rooppur nuclear power plant construction project. Allegations include awarding work to sub-contractors in exchange for kickbacks, importing tax-free stones to conduct stone trading within the plant, and corruption in procuring construction materials and selling scrap.

Local traders are owed billions taka over the years by sub-contractor RoinWorld. Upon speaking to these business owners, it was revealed that they have repeatedly informed Russian and Bangladeshi authorities both in writing and verbally, but their concerns have gone unaddressed. Additionally, some subcontractors face accusations of mass layoffs of Bangladeshi workers without paying salaries and other dues. One affected worker reported that he was dismissed by a sub-contractor without receiving four months' worth of salary and leave entitlements totaling around two lakh Taka. Consequently, the military responsible for the plants security is barring him from entering the project site, and he has been unable to lodge a complaint with anyone. According to him, there are many others who have suffered similarly. When he contacted officials of the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission by phone, they stated that they did not hire him and the companies in question were not under their jurisdiction, so nothing could be done. They advised him to contact Atomstroyexport, but without a pass, the Army would not allow him entry to the project site.

Most of the heavy equipment for the power plant is being manufactured in Russia. According to the general agreement with Russia, circuits and many critical pieces of equipment were to be sourced from General Electric or European companies. However, due to sanctions imposed on Russia in response to its war in Ukraine, these items are now being procured from China. This has sparked concern about the quality and efficiency of the Chinese equipment, which has not previously been used in Russian-built nuclear power plants. Thus, the use of such untested equipment potentially poses a risk to the safety of the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant. Officials of the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission are tasked with inspecting all equipment manufactured in Russia. Yet, it appears that these officials may not have the necessary expertise to conduct such inspections, even as they continue to do so year after year. These officials receive a daily allowance of $300-$400.

The government of Bangladesh has granted a tax exemption on the import of all construction materials for the power plant. Various construction companies involved in this project are benefiting from this exemption. Max Infrastructure, a company engaged in the project, is importing thousands of tons of steel and stone tax-free, allegedly using them for purposes outside the project despite the import permit stating they are for the construction of the project. Consequently, the government is losing a significant amount of tax revenue. Senior officials of the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission, who are involved in the project, have remained silent on the issue.

Furthermore, the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission has recommended to the Office of the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports of the Ministry of Commerce that the import of these materials be tax-exempt. Following this recommendation, tax-free imports were permitted. Upon auditing a tax-exemption recommendation letter, it is evident that the files sent to the Ministry of Commerce for tax-free import permits are managed by the Chief of the Finance and Administration Department, the Project Director's Office, and the Ministry of Science and Technology.

A C&F agent revealed that Russian/domestic companies involved in the project's construction manage import permits and tax clearances through C&F agents. To obtain these import documents, they incur costs ranging from two thousand to one lakh taka per import permit. There is also a reluctance and delay in the issuance of clearances unless specifically requested, resulting in ships arriving at the port or airport without timely clearance, and the construction parties incurring substantial fines.

An Act was enacted in 2015 to establish a company for setting up and operating the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant. Consequently, Nuclear Power Plant Company Bangladesh Limited was founded the same year. According to the Nuclear Power Plant Act, 2015, the Project Director of the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant Construction Project Phase 1 also serves as the Managing Director of Nuclear Power Plant Company Bangladesh Limited. Dr. Shawkat Akbar has been fulfilling these roles since then. Although the first phase of the project was completed in 2017, Dr. Shawkat Akbar has continued as the Managing Director for the past years and is currently the Chairman of the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission.

It is unusual for one individual to simultaneously lead three key organizations, which has led to visible mismanagement within these institutions. The organogram available on the website indicates that there are five Executive Director positions at Nuclear Power Plant Company Bangladesh Limited, which have remained vacant since 2015. The company employs approximately 1,300 staff members, ranging from grades 6 to 20, with twelve individuals at the Manager level (Grade 5). Only one officer spans the range from Managing Director (1st grade) to Manager (5th grade).

When inquired about this scenario, a chief scientific officer at the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission commented that 'the Project Director, who also acts as the Managing Director, does not wish to share his authority. He is accused of running the BAEC, the projects, and the company in an authoritative manner and is not open to input from others'. Although there is one Sub-Project Director and several Chief Scientific Officers, they reportedly have nominal roles and are not allowed significant involvement in the project. Additionally, no senior personnel are attached to the project.

Kabir Hossain is working as Head of Human Resource Department of Project and Nuclear Power Plant Company Bangladesh Limited, without any prior experience of working on Human Resource.

An official of Nuclear Power Plant Company Bangladesh Limited said, "NPCBL does not have any kind of own planning regarding recruitment and training from the human resources department, we are blindly following the prescription given by the Russians. Those who work here for 6 years get their first promotion here, but from other organizations with 3/4 years of experience are being appointed here. There is no practice of this kind anywhere in the power sector. Departmental candidates have no chance here. Higher level training is being given to preferred people. Many people here are frustrated and want to leave their jobs and go somewhere else, but no one is being given leave. Those who left without clearance are being sent letters to pay Tk50 lakh to Tk1 crore, and threatening lawsuits. That is why many people are now leaving the country and migrating abroad."

Talking to another official of Nuclear Power Plant Company Bangladesh Limited, he said, "Before I joined here, I worked at Wasa and Rampal power plants. I have never seen such impractical human resource management anywhere. Everyone working with me here has the same experience. All this. When we talk to the project manager and the head of human resources about the problem, they don't want to hear all this. If you write something on social media, the senior officials are called together and humiliated."

Another official said, "Nuclear Power Plant Company Bangladesh. Ltd. started. In 2015, the service rules have not yet been made. When asked about the service rules to the company secretary he said it is there but cannot be shared. It seems to be the first organization in the world where the service rules are so secret that even its officials cannot see them."

Another official stated, "Nuclear Power Plant Company Bangladesh Limited has a workforce of about 1300 people but seating arrangements are limited to 200 people. There is no initiative for seating arrangements for the rest. It is difficult to continue working like this. In the beginning of recruitment, 95 of the candidates used to join out of every 100 people. Now 40-45 people join among every 100. It is unfortunate for the future of NPCBL. Even the 10 people who are appointed in senior positions are questionable. Some people did not meet the required experience, used fake experience certificates. Some did not have relevant experience, but received appointment letters. But they were appointed without checking all these experience certificates from HR. 10 managers are in this power plant. Key roles in management have been compromised by the Human Resource and the higher authorities, which will be a black spot in the first nuclear power plant of the country.”

The manpower recruited by Nuclear Power Plant Company Bangladesh Limited was sent to Russia for training. Many people have raised questions about the quality of the training in Russia. A chief engineer from the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission stated, "During the training sessions held in Russia, the main instructor teaches in Russian, and a Russian interpreter translates it into English for the trainees. In such circumstances, engineers or those with higher positions may grasp the lectures, but junior engineers often cannot. It is especially difficult for technicians or junior technicians to benefit from these lectures, and there are many of them. Implementing such ineffective training at the cost of 400-500 million dollars is unjustifiable. Recently, a senior technician was dismissed without any investigation or notice due to training issues. Surprisingly, he was rehired as a technician a few days later. Institutionally, it's bizarre; the organization seems to disregard its own rules. Several senior executives have performed poorly in training, yet no actions have been taken against them. On the other hand, lower-grade employees who perform badly are terminated."

Chief Engineer Ashraful Islam of the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission is assigned as the Chief Director at the project site office in Ishwardi. However, he spends most of his time in Dhaka, neglecting his duties at the site. Some current managers of the project have been absent for extended periods without any formal leave, which suggests a lack of accountability. This is not an acceptable situation for the government's most crucial project.

In a strange way, this highly secured project has become a sort of leisure destination for senior government officials. Despite the strict security measures, even after the arrival of the nuclear fuel, senior officials have been visiting the site with their wives, sons, sons' wives, daughters, daughters-in-law, friends, and close relatives. The frequency of such visits is growing, raising serious concerns about the project's safety. Any accident at this site would not be confined to an individual or the project location; its impact could extend for miles, potentially affecting millions.

Constructing a nuclear power plant in a developing country like Bangladesh carries significant risks, with thousands of lives and the nation's economic stability at stake. The government should reconsider the indulgence of a nuclear power plant or attempt to address these issues immediately.

Zulkarnain Saer is an investigative journalist and research analyst.