Come writers and critics / Who prophesize with your pen / And keep your eyes wide /
The chance won't come again …. — Bob Dylan

As I write this, at 2.36pm in Dhaka on 3 August 2024, Bangladesh is on the cusp of a revolution. What started off a month ago as a movement for quota reform is not a veritable student-people’s uprising. Dylan was write, the times, indeed, are a-changin’. Sheikh Hasina’s iron grip on power might, indeed, be nearing its end.

But in the very same line, Dylan warned — And don’t speak too soon / For the wheel’s still in spin / And there’s no tellin’ who / That it’s namin’

There is a lot of uncertainty about how things will evolve in Bangladesh from here on. This post outlines a few ways what might be recorded as the Monsoon Revolution could unfold.

An ugly scenario is always a possibility. But I doubt the ugliest of scenarios involving a Syria style civil war will come to pass. There are two reasons for this. First, Syria has sectarian and ethnic cleavages that Bangladesh doesn’t have. Second, and perhaps more importantly, any civil war will result in mass exodus, and no Indian government, let alone the current Hindutva lot, will want to host millions of Muslim refugees.

If, however, the regime somehow manages to diffuse the current uprising, another ugly scenario is possible — that of an economic implosion, like Zimbabwe. Is this possible? Contingent on the regime surviving, this may well be possible. It’s a world where the regime is limping on as an international pariah, with no access to international finance as the remittance boycott bites while western institutions refuse to engage with a child-killer.

Of course, this is contingent on the regime diffusing the uprising. How does that happen? Well, it could happen if Sheikh Hasina accepts the nine points and buys time. There is a precedence to this. After the 1968-69 uprising shook the regime, Ayub Khan released Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and ZA Bhutto from jail and set up a round table conference.

I don’t think this is a likely scenario. For one thing, who is Hasina going to sit around for parley? But it cannot be ruled out.

Unfortunately, a bad scenario is perhaps a very likely possibility.

What is a bad scenario in this context? To answer that, we need to first understand the good scenario. A historical example of a good scenario is 1990-91, when HM Ershad resigned, the caretaker administration of Shahabuddin Ahmed held an election within 90 days, and the parliament amended the constitution to restore the parliamentary system that was the national consensus at that time.

A similar good scenario now would involve a caretaker administration to restore stability, reform the administration and law enforcement to set the stage for a free and fair election, with the elected parliament reforming the constitution based on a national consensus.

However, this good scenario faces significant obstacles because, unlike 1990-91, the constitutional path is less clear cut, state institutions and the civil society has been damaged far more extensively by Hasina (compared with whom, Ershad seems like the epitome of tolerance and good governance), and there isn’t really a political consensus on what should happen in the post-election Bangladesh.

So, a bad scenario maybe one that involves some form of extraconstitutional manuevering. Specifically, this may involve an extended period of interim government. Ideally, such an interregnum would be used to facilitate a national consensus. However, history also teaches us that the longer such arrangements are in place, the riskier things become.

To reduce the risks of the bad scenario and improve the chances of the good one, we urgently need a framework for a peaceful transfer of power. Come writers and critics who prophesise with your pen, this is what is needed of you — provide a blueprint for transition.

Before we get to these scenarios, however, we have to navigate the next 24-48 hours. As the sea of people across Bangladesh turn to a tsunami, will Hasina’s concessions work? If it doesn’t, and she has to go, I doubt she will have the dignified exit that Ershad enjoyed, with full pomp and protocol of the office of the presidency.

Will she flee abroad an unmarked aircraft to some tropical island? Or will it be a storming of the Ganabhaban?

By the time you read this, the answers maybe obvious. Or maybe we have to wait for a few days more.

But I am confident that we shall overcome!

____

A slightly different version was published in Nuraldeen and is republished under the Creative Commons license.