Since August 15, I have talked to various international media, analysts, and think tanks about the unfolding events in Bangladesh.

Here are a few main pointers which I believe would explain my thoughts on this issue.

Tasks before the interim administration

Immediately, to restore law and order. Bangladesh was without any civilian law enforcement, civil administration, or indeed a government, for several days last week.

The spate of violence and anarchy of those days seem to have abated. Citizens’ efforts have been laudable, but cannot be sustained in the long run. The police are back on the beat. Some form of normalcy should return soon.

Of course, police and other law enforcement agencies are tainted with serious human rights violations. Over the last 15 years, these agencies became the face of the Hasina regime and therefore bore the brunt of public wrath during the uprising.

Since Hasina’s fall, key personnels have been changed in various security agencies and the military as well as in the judiciary and bureaucracy.

But ultimately, decriminalising the security agencies as well as reforming the judiciary and civil administration is a long-term task. The interim administration might not be in power long enough to see these through, but they should begin the process.

Secondly, restore macroeconomic stability, which will also require addressing longer term issues in the banking or energy sectors —again, the interim government might not be able to complete the tasks, but should still initiate them.

The administration should seek to revamp the IMF program to take into account the changed political circumstances. This will help keep the exchange rate, inflation and interest rate stable.

Assuming the restoration of law and order, and efforts to address the banking and energy sector issues, the traditional drivers of the economy —remittance and garments—should fuel a strong recovery in 2025.

As an aside, the administration’s early appointments to key positions seem to be based on professionalism more than political calculations.

Thirdly, work with political parties to develop a national consensus for political reforms so that democracy can endure. Some of these reforms will have to be implemented by the elected politicians. However, other reforms could be initiated before the election.

The tenure of the interim administration

Until they were abolished, election-time caretaker administrations had a tenure of 90 days, though it lasted for two years under a state of emergency in 2007-08.

It is very unlikely that the Yunus administration will hold an election withing 90 days. For one thing, with the civilian administration in tatters and a shell-shocked economy, elections within three months might not be feasible.

Further, the new administration has hinted about its desire for long-lasting institutional and constitutional reforms. And political parties, including BNP, seem to have accepted a timeframe involving an election in the winter of 2025-26.

However, no formal announcement has been made yet, and we should expect a strategic ambiguity regarding how long the interim period will last.

Longer term political landscape

Assuming an election in the winter of 2025-26, the political landscape could change in the intervening period.

The students could form a party to push forward its agenda against discrimination and inequality. The existing and new Islamist factions could realign.

The Awami League could fracture and rebrand, as indeed could BNP. However, under the current electoral system, BNP under Tarique Rahman should still win comfortably in 18 months.

Electoral reforms, particularly a move to proportional system, could however significantly alter electoral arithmetic.

Much will depend on the interim administration’s ability to restore economic and social stability in the coming weeks.

If a sense of normalcy is restored by autumn, including a peaceful Puja season and visible economic recovery, the administration may feel emboldened to attempt electoral reform.

Meanwhile, Awami League may find it difficult to regroup the longer an election is delayed. There may have been attempts of a counter-putsch in the first few days after Hasina’s fall, with exaggerated reports of anti-Hindu violence as a propaganda tool.

Elements within the military and judiciary might have been involved in these attempts. But reshuffles in the cantonments and courts have lessened these threats.

Meanwhile, it is becoming clear that Hasina had abandoned her senior party leaders, not to mention the rank and file.

As the dust settles, the lasting image of Hasina fleeing in a helicopter will make a strong political comeback difficult. Of course, as the saying goes, there is no final word in politics.

International response in the short and longer term

Formally, all regional and global powers have expressed their willingness to work with the interim administration.

Further, the experience of the Hasina regime is that the international community —including the West —is more interested in stability than democracy when it comes to Bangladesh.

Of course, India is less-than-happy with the fall of the Hasina regime.

We see a concerted effort in the Indian media, possibly with a tacit support if not active encouragement of the Modi government apparatus, to portray the people’s revolution as a handiwork of Islamists, and to spread disinformation about alleged communal violence in Bangladesh.

In the longer run, however, India will come to terms with the changed reality. How long Sheikh Hasina stays on Indian soil will be a key indicator of its foreign policy recalibration with respect to Bangladesh.

In contrast, the Americans should be happy with the fall of the regime and the ascent of Professor Yunus, though we can discount the conspiracy theory that the ‘Company’ was behind the whole thing.

It’s clearly in the west’s interest to support Bangladesh’s transition from dictatorship. A revamped IMF program as well as bilateral or multilateral economic and technical support will go a long way towards establishing a durable democracy in the country and facilitating a pro-west government.

That said, the US in particular and the western democracies in general are preoccupied with many other crises, and the interim administration will have to work hard to get their attention.

Finally, China is probably assessing the situation in Dhaka and would not be averse to the interim administration as long as it can maintain stability.

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J Rahman is an economist and writer