Following the government forces' attack on the rally on October 28, the BNP and the political parties in the joint movement have almost consistently organised strikes and blockades, with few interruptions. Initially, these programs garnered significant public support, but that support has dwindled over time. Particularly after the announcement of a unilateral election schedule, the programmes lost considerable popularity and acceptability. People's frustration with these programmes increased as the deadline for withdrawing nomination papers passed. Public life has resumed its normalcy amid events like hartals and blockades. There was an expectation that the BNP would introduce a new programme this time. The repetition of similar programmes led to a sense of boredom. However, these efforts cannot be deemed failures for two reasons.

Firstly, despite the absence of BNP activists, the initial programmes received unprecedented public support. This stands as a significant achievement for the BNP.

Secondly, ordinary people did not hold the BNP responsible for the incidents of vandalism during the hartal-blockade programme. Despite media attempts to link the BNP with these incidents, people believed the government orchestrated these events to blame the BNP. This perception stands as a significant achievement for the BNP. The official commentary lacked credibility, even in the recent Mohanganj Express fire incident. However, journalists and analysts from outside the country, particularly Zulkarnain Sayer, have individually debunked the official narrative on several events, including the October 28 incident, with substantial evidence. Pinaki Bhattacharya, Saheed Alam, Monir Haider, and Tasneem Khalil played significant roles in challenging these narratives. In some cases, their influence appears more impactful than mainstream Bangladeshi media.

However, despite these two successes, it's impossible to consider BNP's movement an overall success. Despite garnering massive public support, the party needed a compelling program to force the government into conducting free, fair, participatory, and peaceful elections. In this context, merely discussing the government's repressive policies and prison tyranny appears insufficient. These issues aren't novel; they have persisted for 15 years. It's time to acknowledge that the BNP couldn't implement sufficiently effective strategies to counter these government policies.

BNP announced a non-cooperation program on December 20 after a continuous strike-blockade programme. The campaign elicited mixed reactions within opposition political circles. Many individuals wonder about the success of this programme. Even BNP workers themselves harbour many questions about its effectiveness. Some consider the extent to which this initiative might perturb the government. There's a growing sentiment that, at this juncture, BNP should directly engage in the field, utilising all efforts to stop the unilateral voting process. However, the top leadership of BNP seems more inclined towards maintaining a non-violent approach. Since mid-2021, they haven't initiated a single confrontational programme. Consequently, adopting non-cooperation as the ultimate tool of this non-violent movement has been quite logical.

However, two out of the five programmes of non-cooperation appear entirely unrealistic to many. They argue that the call to cease paying bills, including taxes, fees, and utilities, will fail. This holds true. There's no apparent reason for this programme to be successful. Yet, it is a mandatory component within the non-cooperation strategy. The American independence movement famously demanded "No Taxation Without Representation," signifying that taxes should not be paid if there was no representation in the legislature. Similar demands were made during the Indian independence movement. This claim also holds logical ground in Bangladesh because the parliament represents a single party, leaving familiar people without representation. Consequently, ordinary citizens cannot vote, rendering the claim reasonable but impractical in the current context. Despite its impracticality, there's no room for bypassing this claim in the non-cooperation programme.

The second demand that appears ineffective is the call for the abstention of polling officials. No officials seem inclined to respond to this call, given the government's control at all levels. However, even if the officials do not respond, there's no doubt that opposition party leaders, activists, and ordinary people will heed the boycott call. Consequently, the people's boycott programme is anticipated to be successful. Despite the government's efforts, a meagre turnout is expected. This programme is exceedingly timely.

A call to abstain from bank transactions is expected to be highly effective. The public's trust in the country's banking system is already considerably low. People opt to invest their money elsewhere rather than in banks. Given this scenario, the call to refrain from bank transactions will likely have a substantial impact. However, its most significant effect will be on remittances. Thus far, various online activists encouraged people to avoid sending remittances through banking channels. If BNP joins this call, it will substantially impact, leading to a further slowdown in remittance flows. This could pose a significant threat to the government.

The call to abstain from appearing in false and absentee cases will likely have a widespread impact. Opposition party leaders and activists know that the consequences of appearing or not appearing are the same—punishment and potential imprisonment or fines. Many activists face punishment regularly, with ongoing arrests, cases of disappearance, and deaths in jails. Given this context, the call to refrain from attending these cases will likely resonate among them.

If three out of the five programmes of non-cooperation prove successful, they will start yielding results. However, BNP leaders must remember that they cannot sustain the movement simultaneously after the election. The majority of leaders are either incarcerated or in hiding. Individuals have faced or will face punishment from the top leader to the two-thousandth leader. It won't be unexpected if the government again targets the homes of field-level leaders during the post-election phase. Given this scenario, attempting to organise a new movement after the election may yield little success, or at the very least, it will require some time.

Even considering a programme for election day is unlikely to succeed. If such a programme were planned, the government would prepare to counter it. Consequently, if the party intends to implement any stringent programme, it must occur within this year, specifically in 2023. The non-cooperation programmes exhibit creativity. Any ambiguity should be clarified, and the campaign bolstered. Non-cooperation programmes reduce the necessity for strikes and blockades. Instead, innovative new programmes could aid in garnering support for their claims. There are indications that the government will face a very delicate situation in the coming week. Therefore, BNP and the parties involved in the concurrent movement must focus on preparations centred around the capital.