In recent decades, the antagonism between the quasi-superpower China and emerging power India has become increasingly pronounced in South Asia. Under its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project, China has strengthened its presence in the region by expanding infrastructure in South Asian countries, particularly sea, road, and rail connectivity. This new Chinese strategy is often referred to as 'infrastructure diplomacy'. India's neighbours in South Asia, except Bhutan, are receiving investment under China's BRI scheme. Since 2016, China has invested over US$150 billion in several South Asian countries, including Bangladesh, the Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan, in the infrastructure sector alone.

The 'Malacca Dilemma' is considered one of the challenges facing China, the dragon economy in the Asia Pacific region. However, China's construction of a 'String of Pearls' with its strategic presence in South Asia creates a similar dilemma for India. India's northeastern region is geographically isolated from the mainland, connected only through the narrow Siliguri Corridor. The Siliguri Corridor is in a vulnerable region bordering Bangladesh, Nepal, and Bhutan. Therefore, China's presence in Bhutan's Doklam, off the corridor, concerns India. For the same reason, India closely monitors China-Bangladesh and China-Nepal relations.

More recently, China's border tensions with India in Ladakh and the release of China's map covering India's Arunachal Pradesh have added a new dimension to Sino-Indian animosity in South Asia. Consequently, there is no doubt that the Sino-Indian rivalry in South Asia will intensify.

While China and India clash in the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, in Bangladesh, both China and India are keen to work with Sheikh Hasina's government, which came to power through disputed elections. Geopolitical analysts are interested in how Sheikh Hasina's government strikes this delicate balance between China and India. There is also the question of how long this balance will hold.

Sheikh Hasina has appointed Hasan Mahmud as the foreign minister after the formation of the new government amidst many controversies at home and abroad. He is known to be close to India in the political arena. Hasan Mahmud visited India on his first foreign visit after becoming the foreign minister. During an event at the influential think tank Vivekananda Foundation in New Delhi, he stated, "Comparing the India-Bangladesh relationship with any other relationship will not work. Bangladesh's relationship with China is primarily economic, whereas India's is by blood."

Indeed, relations with China extend beyond the economic sphere of Bangladesh, encompassing military, strategic, and security ties. Bangladesh's military and strategic collaboration with China has become increasingly pronounced, which is evident in the presence of Chinese-made weapons in the country, particularly in the Bay of Bengal region. Therefore, it is challenging to gauge the extent to which India comprehended Hasan Mahmud's assurance regarding Bangladesh-China relations during the event.

During the event, the minister was queried about Bangladesh-China military relations, to which he responded by mentioning Bangladesh's procurement of some military equipment from India. However, it is essential to acknowledge that while the minister may face pressure to appease India, similar pressures exist and will likely persist from China. Amidst criticism from the Western world regarding the government's perceived 'undemocratic' actions, China has emerged as a vocal supporter, asserting that the government's actions are 'fair'.

Sino-Indian balance in Bangladesh

In 2016, Bangladesh entered into an agreement with China under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with China committing to invest approximately $38 billion in 40 projects. These investments are now tangible in Bangladesh, reflecting China's presence. According to the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), China has invested $9.75 billion in various infrastructure projects in Bangladesh from 2009 to 2019.

Furthermore, China and India actively explore opportunities in Bangladesh's military market. According to a Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report, China supplied 20 per cent of its total arms exports to Bangladesh between 2015 and 2019. As a result, Bangladesh ranks as China's second-largest arms importer in South Asia after Pakistan. 

A significant milestone in Bangladesh's militarisation is the acquisition of two pairs of submarines from China. Bangladesh now joins this group, with only 42 countries in the world possessing submarines. Notably, the Sheikh Hasina Submarine Base construction in Pekua, Cox's Bazar, funded by China with technical assistance amounting to USD 1.2 billion, is underway. This base holds the potential to bolster Bangladesh's military capabilities while securing China's strategic interests in the Bay of Bengal region, raising concerns for both the USA and India.

New Delhi has been attentive to Bangladesh's military aspirations and growing ties with China. During Sheikh Hasina's state visit to India last year, Bangladesh and India inked the first defence agreement under the $500 million Line of Credit (LoC). This agreement entails the procurement of five bridge layer tanks, seven portable steel bridges, and eleven mine-protective vehicles from the Tata Group. Concurrently, the Bangladesh Navy expressed interest in acquiring a logistics ship, floating dock, oil tanker, and an ocean-going tugboat. This defence agreement between Bangladesh and India can be interpreted in two ways: firstly, as a move by India to counter China's influence in the region, and secondly, as a strategic manoeuvre by Bangladesh to maintain a balance between India and China. 

China has played a significant role in Bangladesh's infrastructure development, particularly in projects like the Padma Bridge and the associated rail link, which are part of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China has provided technical assistance to construct the Padma Bridge, a flagship project in Bangladesh. Additionally, through donations, China has contributed to the construction of eight China-Bangladesh friendship bridges, with discussions underway for two more such bridges. Bridge connectivity is crucial in a riverine country like Bangladesh, and China's involvement in these projects highlights its commitment to enhancing infrastructure in the region. Moreover, China has shown interest in the Teesta River Project, which lies along the border with India. This project, if implemented, could potentially bypass the need for the Teesta Treaty with India, demonstrating Bangladesh's pursuit of alternative partnerships. Consequently, a question arises regarding India's level of comfort should the government choose to advance with this project under the influence of Chinese pressure. 

Before the elections, there was a rush within the government to launch projects funded by Chinese and Indian sources. The government has also sought to strike a balance in this initiative.

Before the election, Sheikh Hasina inaugurated South Asia's first underwater tunnel under the Karnaphuli River, built with a 750 million US dollars Chinese fund. Shortly after this, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi jointly inaugurated three significant projects funded by India's Line of Credit (LoC). These projects include the Akhaura (Bangladesh)-Agartala (India) Dual Gauge Rail Project, the Khulna-Mongla Port Railway Construction Project, and the second unit of the Rampal Matari Super Thermal Power Plant in Bagerhat.

Balancing these two forces will become increasingly challenging after the elections. When the foreign minister sought to reassure India in Delhi, the state minister for shipping emphasised, "Bangladesh, as a humanitarian state, has granted India the opportunity to utilise the Chittagong port for transporting goods to other states within the country. According to the agreement with India, their ships are permitted to use the Chittagong port, facilitating the transportation of goods to other Indian states via road from there."

According to various sources, the current government has assured India that, under the Japan-India-Bangladesh tripartite agreement, it will prioritise the establishment of the Matarbari deep-sea port to Tripura connection. On the other hand, China is unlikely to pursue projects deemed 'worrisome' for India. While China may not raise objections to the first initiative, it cannot be guaranteed that China will remain entirely silent on the second. Should China demand reciprocation for its exclusive support to the current government, the government could find itself in a challenging predicament.

The government is grappling with an economic crisis, inflation, and a dollar shortage, exacerbated by its lack of acceptance in the Western world. One non-Western country that could potentially assist the current government in addressing these challenges is China. China is known for its robust trading capabilities and typically invests with specific interests in mind. The government may lean on China to help alleviate the crisis, leveraging its economic strength and resources. However, while seeking assistance from China, the government must maintain diplomatic relations with India. This tie may not last long. 

Sheikh Hasina maintains loyal connections within New Delhi's policy-making circles, and South Block exhibits confidence in her leadership. However, there is speculation among young Indian policymakers regarding who will succeed Sheikh Hasina as a reliable partner for India in Bangladesh. India has struggled to cultivate an alternative ally in Bangladesh beyond Sheikh Hasina. Concerns arise as one key figure, presumably close to India, is currently detained in China. This situation suggests that India may not be at ease with the current state of affairs.

Tensions in South Asian geopolitics regarding the Myanmar issue are evident. Bangladesh, often characterised as 'humanitarian,' allowed India to use its port facilities. However, India did not provide significant support to Bangladesh during the Rohingya crisis. The current government's approach to foreign policy, marked by compromise, may not effectively address the Rohingya crisis.

As the overall situation unfolds, the future of Bangladesh appears increasingly complex. The government, which has faced numerous controversies, may struggle to maintain its position over the long term while attempting to balance relations with China and India. The anxiety and discomfort already apparent within both Chinese and Indian circles regarding the new government may become more pronounced in the next 1-2 years.

Shahadat Hossain , PhD scholar at the South Asian University, New Delhi, and Columnist